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ABSTRACT
Modern malware typically makes use of a domain generation al-
gorithm (DGA) to avoid command and control domains or IPs
being seized or sinkholed. This means that an infected system may
attempt to access many domains in an attempt to contact the com-
mand and control server. Therefore, the automatic detection of DGA
domains is an important task, both for the sake of blocking mali-
cious domains and identifying compromised hosts. However, many
DGAs use English wordlists to generate plausibly clean-looking
domain names; this makes automatic detection difficult. In this
work, we devise a notion of difficulty for DGA families called the
smashword score; this measures how much a DGA family looks like
English words. We find that this measure accurately reflects how
much a DGA family’s domains look like they are made from natu-
ral English words. We then describe our new modeling approach,
which is a combination of a novel recurrent neural network archi-
tecture with domain registration side information. Our experiments
show the model is capable of effectively identifying domains gen-
erated by difficult DGA families. Our experiments also show that
our model outperforms existing approaches, and is able to reliably
detect difficult DGA families such as matsnu, suppobox, rovnix,
and others. The model’s performance compared to the state of the
art is best for DGA families that resemble English words. We believe
that this model could either be used in a standalone DGA domain
detector—such as an endpoint security application—or alternately
the model could be used as a part of a larger malware detection
system.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Security and privacy→Malware and its mitigation; Artifi-
cial immune systems;Web protocol security; •Computingmethod-
ologies→ Neural networks.
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Figure 1: Typical example of malware using a DGA to find
its command-and-control (C&C) server. The infected host at-
tempts to resolve a number of DGA-generated domains, and
connects to the first one that resolves successfully.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Many modern malware families communicate with a centralized
command and control (C&C) server. In order to do this, the malware
must know the location of the C&C server to connect to—simple
approaches might hardcode an IP or a domain name. But, these
are easy to mitigate: the traffic to a specific IP can be trivially
blocked, and domain names can be easily seized. Therefore, modern
malware authors use domain generation algorithms (DGAs) in order
to generate a large set of possible domain names where the C&C
server may exist.
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Typically, an infected machine will use the DGA to serially gen-
erate domain names. Each of these domain names will be resolved,
and if the DNS resolution does not result in an NXDOMAIN re-
sponse (i.e. if the domain name is registered), then the machine will
attempt to connect to the resolved IP as if it is the C&C server. If
any step of that process is not successful, then the machine will
generate another domain name with the DGA and try again, un-
til it is successful. Some DGA families generate random-looking
domain names such as xobxceagb[.]biz; others generate difficult-
to-distinguish domain names like dutykind[.]net.
This DGA-based approach to finding the C&C server is robust
to IP blocking and domain name seizure; the C&C server operator
can use any IP they have access to (and they may use different
IPs at different times), and typically the number of unique domain
names a DGA can generate is quite large, and sometimes the DGA
itself may be hard to reverse engineer. Therefore, it is not generally
feasible to pre-emptively seize all domain names that a DGA could
generate. In fact, DGAs may even generate domain names that
are not malicious or compromised, and this does not affect the
malware’s ability to reach the C&C server eventually.
As a consequence, the task of determining whether or not a given
domain name is produced by a DGA is an integral part of modern
malware defenses. Simultaneously, as DGA authors create DGAs
that generate domain names that do not look randomly-generated,
the challenge of detecting these domain names increases.
A large body of related work seeks to use machine learning tech-
niques directly to classify domains as generated by DGAs or not.
Our contribution adds to this lineage of work; here, our machine
learning detector is one component of an effective malware detec-
tion system. To this end, we describe a machine learning system
that is able to accurately classify a domain name as DGA-generated
or clean using only the domain name itself and some simple addi-
tional features derived from WHOIS data. This system is especially
effective on DGA families that generate domain names based on
English word lists (i.e., domains that look benign to a human ob-
server). Compared to previous approaches, our system performs
better on difficult-to-detect DGA families that resemble English
words (such as the matsnu and suppobox families), and the system
is not difficult to deploy in a real-world environment—either as a
standalone detector or as part of a larger malware detection system.
Overall, this paper makes the following contributions:
• We provide a novel machine learning system built partially
on recurrent neural networks that is capable of classifying
DGA-generated domain names even from families tradition-
ally understood as difficult. To achieve this degree of perfor-
mance, our model takes advantage of side information such
as WHOIS.
• This model is robust: although it is trained with WHOIS
information, predictions can still be made if WHOIS or other
network level information is not available. This is crucial for
real-time detection and prevention of malware outbreaks.
• We devise a new measure that we term the smashword score.
We rank 41 DGAs in terms of detection difficulty using this
measure, giving an intuitive measure of difficulty related
to how closely the domain resembles English words. Our
approach can be re-used for new DGA families, and we
believe our measure is useful for other DGA detection works
in the future.
• We successfully classify difficult DGA-generated domains
using our model that other state-of-the-art approaches could
not conclusively label; this includes domainswith high smash-
word scores (e.g., those that are composed of combinations of
English words). Note that these domains can even be difficult
for humans to classify correctly.
2 RELATEDWORK
The problem of distinguishing legitimate domain names from al-
gorithmically generated is certainly not new, and has been studied
for a number of years. DGAs first became widely known to the
community with the introduction of Kraken [24] and Conficker
[35] in 2008. Since that time, DGAs in malware have proliferated.
The early efforts to stop this threat were dealing with lack of
sufficient training data to apply machine learning approaches [4].
One decade later it continues to be a problem but to a smaller
extent. Thus early proposed approaches and techniques were rather
statistical. For example Yadav et al. [44] applied such technique to
show differences between valid domain names and algorithmically
generated ones. The limitation of such approach would be that it
often does not transfer to a different DGA family.
Another milestone in detection techniques was credited to more
extensive usage of DNS data. For example Zhou et al. [47] gathered
DNS NXDOMAIN data from RDNSs and then used it to assemble a
set of suspicious algorithmically generated domain names.
A different approach was proposed by Jian et al. [20]. It relied on
DNS traffic analysis but only for failed lookups. In this technique
interactions between hosts and failed domain names would be ex-
tracted. Then a graph decomposition algorithm using nonnegative
matrix tri-factorization technique to iteratively extract coherent
co-clusters would be applied. The obtained sub-graphs would be
further analyzed by exploring temporal properties of generated
clusters. The authors claim that their anomaly based approach can
detect new and previously undiscovered threats.
Further research efforts evolved towards more and more exten-
sive usage of machine learning techniques. At a large scale, it was
pioneered by Phoenix [36] that was able to use both the URLs and
other side information to detect DGA botnets. The list of parameters
observed by this system includes some handcrafted features like
pronounceability, blacklist information, DNS query information.
This approach does not use any recurrent neural network (RNN) or
powerful modeling technique for the domains themselves leaving
a room for improvement. Tong and Nguyen [42] have already pro-
posed extensions to the Phoenix system. They included additional
measures such as entropy, n-grams and modified distance metric
for domain classification.
Further progress in DGA detection was reported when using ma-
chine learning techniques. For example, Zhao et al. [46] addressed
the problem in the context of detecting APT malware. The authors
proposed 14 features based on their big data research to character-
ize different properties of malware-related DNS and the ways that
they are queried as well as defined network traffic features that can
identify the traffic of compromised clients that have remotely been
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controlled. The features are comprised of signature-based engine,
anomaly-based engine and so-called dynamic DNS features. The
data was filtered by using Alexa1 popularity and prevalence based
on the number of hosts connecting to domains. As the outcome,
an engine was built and it was used to compute reputation scores
for IP addresses using extracted features vectors. The results are
produced by using the J48 decision tree algorithm.
A comparable approach was presented by Luo et al. [27] who
described a system using lexical patterns that were extracted from
clean domains listed in the Alexa top 100k domains as well as
confirmed malicious DGA cases. The proposed approach is machine
learning-based and achieves 93% accuracy for detecting malicious
domains on the test dataset.
Additional improvements for state of the art results were re-
ported by Woodbridge et al. [43]. Despite a relatively simple Long
Short-TermMemory (LSTM) network used to classify DGAdomains,
the approach was reported to have a high level of effectiveness.
The presented results still have certain shortcomings, especially for
difficult DGA classes that resemble English words.
The same problem was approached from a different angle by
Anderson et al. [2]. The authors use a Generative Adversarial Net-
work (GAN) to generate adversarial DGA domain names to try and
deceive a classifier. The authors were able to achieve this goal. Then
the GAN-generated domain names were added to the training set,
which resulted in improved DGA detection performance. However,
the authors did not test on any DGA families that look like they
are made up of English words.
Shibahara et al. [38] proposed a slightly different algorithm that
is using RNN on changes in network communication with a goal
of reducing malware analysis time. This approach is not DGA-
only specific but rather generic and attempts to cover other types
of malware. However, it could successfully be used against DGA-
type of threats based on their communication patterns. Thus this
technique requires additional run-time data that is not required in
many of the other approaches as it requires malware sandboxing.
The authors claim that without their optimization the analysis time
takes over 15 min. and their approach reduces this time by 67%,
preserving the detection rate of malicious URLs at 97.9%.
Overall, though the task of DGA detection is certainly not new,
there has not been much focus on directly detecting DGA families
made from English words using the domain itself as a feature. This
task has been described as ‘extremely difficult’ in some previous
works [43]. Here, our focus is specifically on those DGA families.
3 MEASURING THE DIFFICULTY OF
DETECTION OF A DGA FAMILY
Since data-based approaches for the detection of malicious domains
have been a recurrent trend during recent years, it is inevitable that
malware authors would shift to generation algorithms that overlap
with lexical patterns commonly found in clean datasets to avoid
being detected. Taking into account this adversarial environment,
we need to be able to measure how our DGA detection models
will perform not only overall, but also against the most difficult
samples. In this context, ‘difficult’ samples can be understood to be
those that trick existing detectors—the most relevant example is
1See https://www.alexa.com/topsites.
those DGA families that combine English words, like the matsnu
family [39], which was one of the first of many families to build
domain names from English word lists. These generate domains like
the natural-looking domains songneckspiritprintmetal[.]com
and westassociatereplacerisk[.]com, which present a much
harder challenge to the many detection systems that depend on
lexical features [2, 36, 43, 45].
An exploratory data analysis of our dataset shows that DGA
families have characteristics that can affect the performance of
classification approaches. From an information theory point of view,
both the average length l¯(·) and the average character entropy [37]
c¯(·) of the domain names seem likely to be interesting features to
compare. The entropy of a single domain x is calculated as below:
cˆ(x) = −
∑
xi ∈x
p(xi ) log2 p(xi ) (1)
where p(xi ) is the empirical probability of the character xi in the
string x . However, in our experiments, we found no serious corre-
lation between the average character entropy c¯(·) of a DGA family
and if that family was made up of difficult English-like words. Thus,
we cannot use c¯(·) as a proxy for the difficulty of detecting a family.
Therefore, we have developed the smashword score sˆ(·), which
is the the average n-gram overlap (with n ranging from 3-5) with
words from an English dictionary. The computation of the smash-
word score amounts to calculating term-frequency inverse-document-
frequency (TF-IDF) [40] scores for a domain name using an English
list of words as a reference document set. Specifically:
sˆ(x) = 1|Ni, j (x)|
∑
ni ∈Ni, j (x )∩Ni, j (D)
log (|{d ∈ D : ni ∈ d}|) . (2)
In this equation, Ni, j (x) refers to the set of character n-grams
in the domain x of length i or j, D refers to the English word list,
and Ni, j (D) refers to the set of character n-grams in the entire
word list D of length i or j. The log term is the count of times an
n-gram appears in the entire word list D. If there is no overlap in
any n-grams between the domain and the word list, the score is has
a lower bound of 0 and an upper bound depends on the word list.
The score is normalized to the number of n-grams in the domain.
Computing the smashword score sˆ(x) for a string x can be done
inmin(|N3,4,5(x)|, |N3,4,5(D)|) operations; but since |N3,4,5(x)| will
generally be much smaller than |N3,4,5(D)|, we can say that the
computation will generally take time linear in the length of the
string x , since in a string with length |x |, there are |x | − 2 3-grams,
|x | − 3 4-grams, and |x | − 4 5-grams.
The average smashword score s¯(·) of a DGA family is then cal-
culated by simply taking the average smashword score sˆ(·) of all of
the domains in that family that are present in the data.
We can expect that domains with a high smashword score will
resemble English words, and thus we expect that s¯(·) is a good
indicator of the difficulty of detecting a DGA domain. Indeed, in the
following section we find that our data bears out this expectation.
4 DGA FAMILIES
Before introducing our proposed classifier and experiments, we
introduce our dataset of DGA families and clean domains in order
to perform some exploratory analyses. In this section we establish
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DGA family n l¯(x) c¯(x) s¯(x) sample 1 sample 2
banjori3 435385 22.165 3.767 173.909 iivnleasuredehydratorysagp[.]com yanzvinskycattederifg[.]com
beebone3 210 13.223 3.466 66.159 backdates10[.]com dnsfor3[.]net
chinad6 256 19.843 3.882 19.565 evybt5gtf2tprvbi[.]info m5j42r6uiqov2dgm[.]biz
conficker5 100000 11.754 3.208 19.988 jemmmpo[.]ws xobxceagb[.]biz
gozi3 1212 23.262 3.550 222.240 questionibus[.]com chrisredemptisviros[.]com
locky5 8 14.125 3.226 20.800 pccibcjncnhjn[.]yt qtysmobytagnrv[.]it
matsnu6 99995 30.527 3.757 332.581 dutytillboxpossessprogress[.]com dropbridgeexplorecraftgive[.]com
murofet6 102020 41.619 4.488 38.683 hyernzfvd10k57lyozotazkrp52gzfyp22eu[.]org m19e41hydyfxgtcxjyn10nynukulxdvhub18[.]com
necurs6 2048 17.029 3.541 31.256 gmwyfuhwqveqcbasvtj[.]in pysetkbwbryxbegmwg[.]eu
newgoz6 1000 29.885 4.214 23.476 afkv141b7q87du27t2i1b91gfp[.]biz krx32h1jjusuatm2aetjkn6jn[.]org
others_dga_b7 2775 19.233 3.485 90.369 qktpxl[.]info meatopen[.]net
proslikefan6 130 11.584 3.225 20.768 rxxeqcoy[.]cc avhpdzz[.]com
pykspa6 5010 14.470 3.375 40.551 tdxiogn[.]org dwaejwfox[.]cc
qakbot6 5000 20.719 3.740 43.164 hfbtlwqlqvoywaknjksaaeeus[.]net wlwcrapplotshymcia[.]org
ramdo6 100000 20.000 3.393 51.347 aaooekcoyysuouaa[.]org skmaogeyiwqgeyym[.]org
ramnit6 100 17.340 3.585 35.981 ckyioylutybvcxv[.]com ibvtknxochoyjidm[.]com
ranbyus6 80 18.750 3.684 35.726 cyedjumagsrrav[.]cc jxbdxeyxttdmcjagi[.]me
rovnix6 99764 26.797 3.685 284.222 coloniesgovernmentsthe[.]com tohavetheontheofassent[.]com
shiotob6 2001 16.566 3.655 20.998 cwitdw951w1n9cm[.]net 3pttjmaw2g[.]com
suppobox6 258 17.298 3.341 152.536 bartholomewalbertson[.]net dutykind[.]net
tinba6 101001 16.006 3.457 31.592 fuvfpkpwgjqj[.]com hosvsbvbveee[.]com
volatile3 352 19.000 3.745 112.362 hpyersgtdobfla[.]info ergtydobflashp[.]info
Table 1: Information about a representative set of DGA families. We include the number of samples n, average length l¯(·), the
average entropy c¯(·), the average smash-word score s¯(·), and two examples of the domains found in the family. Families with
high smash-word score are given in bold.
the Ground Truth (GT) datasets for both confirmed DGA and non-
DGA domains. Each of our sources are taken from public locations,
making our dataset straightforward to reproduce.
4.1 DGA Ground Truth Set
The GT for DGA domains consists of domains generated using
Python implementations of real-world malware families using vari-
ous seeds if necessary as an input, as well as domains collected from
the wild. In order to have sufficiently diverse coverage, the follow-
ing entities were selected in order to represent many wide-spread
patterns of DGA domains seen in-the-wild in 2017/2018:
• random-looking 2nd level domain names
• random-looking 3rd level domain names with generic 2nd
level domain (usually dynamic DNS provider)
• domain names comprised of random words (generally Eng-
lish)
The last type of domains was of our particular interest as lexi-
cally they are virtually indistinguishable from legal domains which
means that some extra techniques are required for detection.
In almost all cases DGAs are using some sort of input seeds in
order to either randomize the output and don’t generated the same
domains twice, or make it unpredictable for researchers to avoid
blocking or sinkholing. Here are some of the popular seeds:
• current date and/or time
• value embedded into a sample/group of samples by campaign
(usually one DWORD)
• string(s) available online either on a malware authors or
public server
• 3rd party public online document (for example, The US Dec-
laration of Independence, the Apple license, etc)
In addition, some work has been done to make sure that there
are diverse top level domains (TLDs) represented as malware au-
thors tend to use only some particular ones which may introduce
substantial skew to our dataset. Overall, we have collected 41 DGA
families. Information on each family is given in Table 1, including
the average entropy c¯(·) and average smashword score s¯(·). The
families are collected from multiple sources and denoted in the
table: DGArchive2, an implementation for the locky family found
on Github3, Andrey Abakumov’s DGA repository on Github4, and
Johannes Bader’s DGA implementations5. Smaller or unknown fam-
ilies were grouped as others_dga and others_dga_b 6. All of this
data is publicly available; our set of DGA domains is reproducible.
4.2 Non-DGA Ground Truth Set
For non-DGA domains the GT is comprised of domains found in
the Alexa top 1 million sites and the OpenDNS public domain
lists7, giving 1.02M clean domains for the clean GT set. There were
multiple major problems that had to be addressed:
2See https://dgarchive.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/.
3See https://github.com/sourcekris/locky.
4See https://github.com/andrewaeva/DGA.
5See https://johannesbader.ch and https://github.com/baderj/domain_generation_
algorithms.
6Sinkholed domains collected from public WHOIS registration information containing
jgou.veia@gmail.com as the contact email.
7These lists can be found at https://github.com/opendns/public-domain-lists.
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(1) some prevalent DGA domains can manage to get into the
list of world top popular domains,
(2) 3rd level domains should be covered separately,
(3) some DGA domains are so short that they collided with the
non-DGA domains, and
(4) some DGA domains use combinations of English words, so
the chances that they collide with non-DGA domains are
quite high.
In the last two cases, malware authors have no problemwhen col-
lisions take place, as in any case malware will be waiting for a valid
response from the C&C before following up. Just the opposite, such
cases can make the work of security engineers more complicated as
they cannot simply ban all domains generated by the DGA—since
some domains are known to be clean. In our dataset, we only found
12 such domains that existed in both the non-DGA and DGA sets.
It presents no modeling problem to leave these points in both sets.
5 SIDE INFORMATION
DGA families with a high average smashword score sˆ(·) are very
hard to classify based on the domain names alone. In fact, human
analysts may even have a difficult time differentiating—for instance,
it is plausible at first glance that darkhope.netmight be a personal
website for a 1990s-era teenaged computer enthusiast. In reality,
that domain name is generated by the suppobox DGA. Thus, we
cannot hope to build an effective classification system using single
domain names alone.
Therefore, we augment our domain names with side information,
which we collect from the WHOIS database [11]. Specifically, given
a domain name, we perform a WHOIS lookup, and extract the
following numeric or Boolean features:
• has_registrarname: Boolean, indicates whether a registrar
name is available.
• has_contactemail: Boolean, indicates if any contact email
is available.
• days_since_created, days_since_updated,
days_until_expiration: numeric, the number of days since
the domain was created, updated, or until expiration
• status_length: numeric, length of the “status” field
• has_registrant_info, has_admincontact_info,
has_billingcontact_info, has_techcontact_info,
has_zonecontact_info: Boolean, indicates whether con-
tact information is available.
• has_registrar_iana_id: indicateswhether a registrar IANA
ID is given.
Note that for a non-registered domain name (NXDOMAIN), the
boolean features will all be false, and the numeric features will
all be taken as 0.
We do not perform any semantic analysis on the content of the
WHOIS record; instead, we focus on those features most likely to
give us information relevant to DGAs and C&C servers: temporal
information about the registration, and whether the domain itself
is registered. The features we are using roughly match the type of
features used by Ma et al. [28].
For our dataset, we used a snapshot of collected WHOIS data
with 245M records. For our clean domain names, we matched 927k
domains (91.7%) to WHOIS data, and for the DGA domains, we
matched only 2.3k domains (0.18%) toWHOIS data. This is expected,
given that most DGA domains are never registered. In practice,
either a snapshot of WHOIS data (potentially updated nightly) or
on-demand access of the WHOIS data could be used, depending on
the scalability needs of the deployment.
In our dataset, DGA families have an average of 3.5% of their
domains matched toWHOIS data; with the ramnit family matching
the highest percentage at 84%, and the pandex family matching the
lowest nonzero percentage at 0.008% (only 7 out of 91758 domains
registered). 19 families, totaling 321k domains, have no domains
matched to any WHOIS data.
Although having matching WHOIS data for a domain is strongly
correlated with whether or not the domain arises from a DGA, note
that a detector built to classify a domain as malicious simply if
there is no WHOIS data would not be very effective: with our data,
it would achieve a true positive rate (TPR) of 96.5%, but with an
unacceptably high false positive rate (FPR) of 8.3%. Though WHOIS
data gives us good information, it is not sufficient for prediction.
5.1 WHOIS and GDPR
After the passing of the European privacy bill GDPR [10], it is
unclear howWHOIS lookups will be affected [19]. At the time of our
experiments, WHOIS data was still publicly available. However, if
this is not the case in the future, it would be easy to find alternatives.
Given that the important features we extract depend more on the
temporal registration information than the contact details of the
registrant, we could replace ourWHOIS features with DNS tracking
systems like Active DNS [23] or the Alembic system [25].
At the time of this writing, it is not clear what the long-term solu-
tion for WHOIS data will be. But, since WHOIS data is widely used
for security applications [5, 6, 28], it seems unlikely that the types
of features we are using for our system will become unavailable.
6 MODEL ARCHITECTURE
Given the effectiveness of deep learning classifiers for character-
level DGA modeling [43, 45], we have designed our DGA detec-
tor on character-level recurrent neural networks (RNNs) [21]. A
character-level RNN sequentially receives characters from a string,
updating internal state as each character is passed in. Instead of
training the RNNs to predict the class of the domain, we instead
train two RNNs to predict the next character in the domain and
combine these predictions via a generalized likelihood ratio test
(GLRT). In addition, our model also incorporates the WHOIS side
information discussed in the previous section via model stacking.
This allows us to achieve significantly better performance on more
difficult DGA families.
Overall, our model is a logistic regression classifier built on the
output of four different models:
(1) A character-level RNN GLRT model built only on the subdo-
mains in the training set.
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(2) A character-level RNN GLRT model built only on the do-
mains in the training set.
(3) One-hot encoded top-level domain features (for the most
popular 250 TLDs).
(4) Extracted features from the WHOIS information.
The overall architecture of the model can be seen in Figure 2. In
the following subsections we describe the details of the full model.
6.1 Character-level RNN GLRT
The core of the model is the character-level RNN that uses the
generalized likelihood ratio test to classify a domain or a subdomain
as DGA or non-DGA. Previous approaches and other uses of RNNs
often predict the class of the output directly [16, 43]; however, this
only allows backpropagation of the error signal at the end of the
entire sequence, which can slow the learning process.
Therefore, we build one RNN on each class in the input dataset
(in our case, there are only two classes: DGA and non-DGA). Each
input sequence is converted to a one-hot character encoding, and
the label or expected output of the RNN for each time step is the
one-hot encoding of the next character in the sequence. This means
the RNN is trained to predict the next character in the sequence.
Thus, backpropagation can be done at every timestep, instead of
waiting until the end of the sequence to compare the output of
the RNN with the desired label. Our model’s architecture is a sin-
gle LSTM layer [18] followed by a single dense layer, pictured in
Figure 3. We use LSTMs to help avoid the vanishing and explod-
ing gradient phenomenons [33]. Although it is possible to build a
more complex network, we found that this provides a good balance
between training time and the accuracy of the model.
In order to perform the one-hot encoding, we first build a dictio-
naryD on the entire training set, including the ‘unknown’ character
’?’. If a character is encountered at prediction time that is not in
D, then it is encoded as ’?’.
We use the categorical cross-entropy [14] for the loss function.
Then, during prediction, at each time step i for the input x , the
output of the model θ is a probability p(xi |(x0, . . . ,xi−1),θ ) and
likelihoods
www.website.com
one-hot TLD
www website com
WHOIS featureslikelihoods
GLRT LSTM
(for domains)
Matched WHOIS
side information
output classification
e.g. P (clean) = 0.99; P (malicious) = 0.01
One-hot encoding
(for TLDs)
input domain
e.g. www.website.com
GLRT LSTM
(for subdomains)
Logistic regression
Figure 2: Overall architecture of our proposed DGA detec-
tion model that incorporates side information. Input points
are split into subdomain, domain, and TLD. The subdomain
and domain are run through individual RNN+GLRT mod-
els, then the output is combined with the WHOIS data and
the one-hot encoded TLD into the final logistic regression
model.
with this we can construct an estimate of the likelihood of the point
x arising from the model θ :
p(x |θ ) =
∏
i
p(xi |(x0, . . . ,xi−1),θ ). (3)
For the generalized likelihood ratio test [31], if we calculated
both likelihood estimatesp(x |θnon-dga) andp(x |θdga), we could then
set a threshold η and compute
Λ(x) = p(x |θdga)
p(x |θnon-dga)
, (4)
and if η > Λ(x), we classify the point as a DGA domain; otherwise,
we classify the point as non-DGA. The value of η can be swept in
order to control the false positive and true positive rate. η is directly
related to the typical posterior probability of a classifier; in fact, if
we normalize the likelihood estimates we can produce a posterior
probability of x being a DGA domain:
p(θdga |x) =
p(x |θdga)
p(x |θnon-dga) + p(x |θdga)
. (5)
Then, setting a threshold for p(θdga) is reducible to setting a
GLRT threshold η.
For our DGA classifier, we build two separate RNN-GLRTmodels
as described above: one on the subdomains of our training set, and
one on the domains. Each of these two models, in turn, contains
a separately-trained LSTM RNN, whose outputs are combined to
perform the GLRT as shown above.
As input to the logistic regression model, we extract six features
from each RNN-GLRT model, giving a total of twelve features. The
features are listed below.
• Aboolean feature indicatingwhether a domain or subdomain
could be extracted from the input domain x .
• The likelihood estimate p(x |θnon−dga).
• The likelihood estimate p(x |θdga).
• The posterior probability p(θnon−dga |x).
σ (·) ...
input character
σ (·)σ (·) σ (·)σ (·)σ (·)
LSTM LSTMLSTM LSTMLSTMLSTM ...
output predictions for next character
Figure 3: The individualRNNmodel architecture. Themodel
takes a one-hot encoded character as input (along with its
current hidden state) in order to predict the next character
in the sequence.
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• The posterior probability p(θdga |x).
• The likelihood ratio Λ(x).
Since we are extracting the likelihood estimates and posterior
probabilities into a logistic regression model, we actually have no
need to select a threshold η—that is only needed for a standalone
GLRT LSTM model. Instead, in our combined model, the logistic
regression will learn directly from the probabilities and likelihoods.
6.2 Top-level domain features
Since TLDs are so short (usually two or three characters), it is
excessive to train an RNN on them. Therefore, we use a one-hot
encoding of the TLD, matching against the 249 most frequent TLDs
in our training dataset; if there is no match, the TLD is encoded as
‘other’, giving a total of 250 binary features out of the TLD.
In order to perform the conversion, we used the TLD list avail-
able from http://publicsuffix.org. The most common TLDs in our
dataset were .com, .org, .ru, .net, and .info. We found that the
.ru, .info, .biz, and .cc TLDs contained significantly higher con-
centrations of DGA domains, with each of those TLDs containing
at least 3 times as many DGA as non-DGA domains. Since we have
split these into separate features, we can expect our model to learn
which TLDs domain generation algorithms are more likely to use.
6.3 WHOIS side information
The WHOIS data makes up the rest of the input to the logistic
regression model. It is concatenated with the RNN-GLRT features
for the domain, the RNN-GLRT features for the subdomain, and
the one-hot encoded TLD features.
Before all of these features are fed into the logistic regression
model, we perform whitening via PCA for decorrelation and scal-
ing [22]. This step can improve the performance of the model,
although it generally also makes interpretability more difficult.
6.4 Computational concerns
Recurrent neural networks, especially those with complex mem-
ory cells like LSTMs, are well-known to be time-consuming to
train [12, 26]. Our model is not exempt from this; for large datasets,
it may take many hours to train8. However, in practice this is not a
concern—a single forward pass through the model for classification
is comparatively very fast, and once our model is trained, there
are no computational difficulties with deployment in a low-latency
detection system. This means that the model can be, e.g., deployed
into a consumer endpoint security product without problems.
7 ADVERSARIAL SAMPLES
In recent years, the phenomenon of adversarial samples has surfaced
in the deep learning community [15, 41]. In essence, a malicious
actor could take a sample that was correctly classified by the model,
perturb the input slightly, and the perturbed sample would be mis-
classified. When images are used, these perturbations are often
invisible to the eye. These adversarial attacks have been success-
fully applied to fields outside of images, including audio [8] and
malware classification [17]. Though there are some defense mecha-
nisms that have been developed [13, 32], many of these are later
found to be circumventable [7].
8Our training was conducted on a high-end consumer-grade system with a single
GPU.
Given that adversarial samples are not limited to images, it is
reasonable to believe that neural network-based DGA detectors
could also suffer from this vulnerability. In our situation a mali-
cious actor would wish to take a domain that is detected as from a
DGA and have it labeled as a non-DGA domain. It would be very
straightforward to perform an attack like the Fast Gradient Sign
Method [41] to modify the characters in a domain name. In fact, it
is not (generally) important to DGA authors what the domain name
looks like, so there is no cost to modify the letters of the domain.
Such a technique would likely prove effective against an ap-
proach that only incorporated the domain name itself. However,
note that our model also incorporates domain registration side in-
formation from WHOIS. Although a malware author can change
the domain name they are using at will and nearly arbitrarily, it
is significantly more difficult to cause the WHOIS registration in-
formation (such as registration date) to have specific values. To do
that, a malware author might need to register a domain perhaps
months in advance and host a clean website on it, which is both
expensive and time-consuming. Thus, it would be more difficult for
a malware author to work around our proposed model.
8 EXPERIMENTS
The most important situation for any DGA detection model is when
it encounters an entirely new DGA family that it has never seen
before. This is the situation that we focus on in our experiments,
since it reflects the real-world ‘zero-day’ situation. We compare
our model to several baselines that reflect the state-of-the-art for
machine learning systems that do not use network traffic data.
Leave-one-outmodels. To simulate the situation where a DGA
family has not been seen, we validate the performance of our DGA
detection model by performing leave-one-out experiments, where
we train the model on all DGA families except one, and then the
test set consists entirely of the left-out DGA family combined with
some never-before-seen non-DGA domains. This shows us how
well the model is able to generalize to unseen DGA family types.
Dataset details. Our collected dataset, as described in Section 4,
includes 41 DGA families plus non-DGA data, totaling 2.3 million
domain names (1.01 million non-DGA, 1.28 million DGA). Of these
41 DGA families, many with high average smashword score have
been specifically mentioned in related work as difficult. The LSTM
model of Woodbridge et al. [43] is specifically shown to perform
very poorly on the matsnu, suppobox, and beebone families, each
of which have above average to very large average smashword
scores. Mac et al. [29] claim that matsnu is not differentiable from
non-DGA domains at all, and show very poor performance on
all their surveyed algorithms for the nymaim DGA, which is very
similar to the gozi DGA that we use here. Because our model
has been specifically designed to focus on DGA families that are
understood to be more difficult, we will focus on these families.
Baseline models.We wish to compare the performance of our
proposed model with existing and baseline approaches. Therefore,
we compare our model with four other models, which we now
introduce. Two of these are simple baseline models, with and with-
out WHOIS information, and the other two are based on LSTM
architectures that represent the most closely related state-of-the-art
work of Woodbridge et al. [43].
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(a) ROC curves for matsnu family. (b) ROC curves for rovnix family.
(c) ROC curves for gozi family. (d) ROC curves for banjori family.
Figure 4: ROC curves for different families.
• lr-tfidf: logistic regression on TF-IDF features extracted
from the domain name using 2-grams.9 Any WHOIS side
information is not used here, so this model presents a rea-
sonable baseline using only the domain name.
• lr-tfidf-aug: logistic regression on TF-IDF features extracted
from the domain name using 2-grams, and augmented with
the WHOIS features. This is a reasonable baseline for classifi-
cation using both the domain name and the side information
(WHOIS features).
• glrt-lstm: a GLRT LSTMmodel built only on the full domain
name (no side information). This can be considered to be a
slight improvement over the model of Woodbridge et al. [43]
due to the use of the GLRT.
• glrt-lstm-aug: a GLRT LSTM model built only on the full
domain name, and then used as input to a logistic regression
model, with the WHOIS features augmented.
Our model.We refer to our model as the split-glrt-lstm-aug
model; this is the model from Section 6.
9We did not use 3-grams, because the memory usage on our system was too large.
Training and implementation details. The lr-tfidf and lr-
tfidf-aug models were implemented with scikit-learn [34], and
the three LSTM-based models were implemented with Keras [9]
using the TensorFlow backend [1]. Each LSTM model used 500
LSTM units and was trained for 100 epochs (passes over the dataset)
with early stopping using the RMSprop optimizer, with dropout of
0.2. With our setup (one nVidia GeForce GTX TITANX), each LSTM
model took approximately 8-10 hours to train. In our experiments,
we found that changing the optimizer made little difference to the
resulting model, and we found that increasing or decreasing the
number of LSTM units decreased performance slightly. Overall, our
model seemed to be relatively robust to hyperparameter choice.
Figure 4 shows receiver operating characteristic curves (ROC
curves) on the four datasets with highest smashword score. We can
see in the figures that the split-glrt-lstm-augmodel (our proposed
model) outperforms each of the other models, providing better per-
formance at lower false positive rates. For instance, on the difficult
matsnu family, when the false positive rate is chosen to be 0.5%,
the split-glrt-lstm-aug model operates at a true positive rate of
95%, whereas the next best model (lr-tfidf-aug) operates at a true
positive rate of only 70%.
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family s¯(x) lr-tfidf lr-tfidf-aug glrt-lstm glrt-lstm-aug split-glrt-lstm-aug
matsnu 332.6 0.581 0.824 0.501 0.546 0.891
rovnix 284.2 0.540 0.758 0.515 0.635 0.805
gozi 222.2 0.540 0.684 0.520 0.548 0.773
banjori 173.9 0.701 0.585 0.634 0.508 0.808
suppobox 152.5 0.509 0.505 0.579 0.798 0.568
volatile 112.4 0.605 0.498 0.818 0.850 0.958
others_dga_b 90.4 0.649 0.502 0.704 0.604 0.677
beebone 66.2 0.498 0.498 0.498 0.498 0.749
ramdo 51.4 0.902 0.498 0.973 0.498 0.980
qakbot 43.2 0.940 0.498 0.966 0.914 0.951
pykspa 40.6 0.777 0.498 0.911 0.866 0.957
murofet 38.7 0.975 0.498 0.960 0.498 0.994
ranbyus 35.7 0.940 0.498 0.963 0.815 0.791
tinba 31.6 0.859 0.498 0.968 0.655 0.867
necurs 31.3 0.818 0.498 0.813 0.514 0.581
new_goz 23.3 0.863 0.498 0.993 0.498 0.990
shiotob 21.0 0.653 0.498 0.894 0.846 0.902
locky 20.8 0.849 0.498 0.751 0.498 0.557
proslikefan 20.8 0.647 0.498 0.802 0.600 0.665
conficker 19.9 0.609 0.498 0.836 0.619 0.649
chinad 19.6 0.786 0.498 0.952 0.498 0.979
dyre 6.5 0.548 0.498 0.779 0.498 0.974
Table 2: Partial AUC (FPR <= 0.01) performance numbers for selected different DGA families, with a focus on those with either
high or low average smashword score. Our split-glrt-lstm-aug model performs best on those DGA families with high average
smashword score.
In typical application scenarios, we typically care only about
running our classifier at false positive rates less than or equal to 1%
(FPR ≤ 0.01). Therefore, we study the performance of the classifiers
using the partial AUC [30] measure, which is the standard area-
under-the-curve (AUC) measure specific to false positive rates less
than a given threshold. In Table 2, we show the partial AUC of
each model for each leave-one-out family experiment, sorted by
decreasing s¯(·).
On the most difficult families (with large s¯(·)), the proposed split-
glrt-lstm-aug reliably and significantly outperforms all other com-
pared models. This is the region of most interest in our work, as
these families are difficult to detect—even with WHOIS data. Each
of these difficult families generates domains that resemble English
words; see Table 1. Note that the lr-tfidf-augmodel and glrt-lstm-
augmodels both have access to the WHOIS features; however, only
split-glrt-lstm-aug is able to take advantage of these to provide
good performance for families with high s¯(·).
For ‘easier’ families with lower s¯(·), where the generated domains
typically look more like random characters, classification can be
performed more reliably with only the text of the domain itself;
thus, the glrt-lstm model is dominant in this regime.
Overall, we see that our model is successful in detecting DGA-
generated domains that resemble English words. The model appears
to generalize well to different families, given the nature of our leave-
one-out experiments.
9 CONCLUSION
In this paper we have considered the problem of DGA domain de-
tection. We introduced a measure of complexity for DGA families
called the smashword score, which reflects how closely a DGA’s
generated domains resemble English words. Because DGA fami-
lies with higher smashword scores have typically posed greater
difficulty for detection, we build a novel machine learning model
consisting of recurrent neural networks (RNNs) using the general-
ized likelihood ratio test (GLRT), and augment these models with a
logistic regression model that also includes side information such
as WHOIS information.
This combined model notably outperforms existing state-of-the-
art approaches on DGA families with high smashword score, such
as the difficult matsnu and suppobox families. We believe that this
model could be used as either a standalone model or as a part of a
larger DGA detection system that could also incorporate network
traffic, such as something more like the Pleiades system [3].
There is room for future improvement in our work. Themodel we
have used is specialized for DGA families based on English words,
and therefore can be less effective for those DGA families that do not
look like natural domain names. Thus, in a production environment
or in an improved system, our model could be ensembled with other
techniques that are more effective for DGA families with lower
smashword scores.
In a future work we would also like to explore multilingual
approaches to tackle new families that may use non-English dictio-
naries and expand our side information features.
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